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FREEDOM TO DEFRAUD: STONERIDGE, 
PRIMARY LIABILITY, AND THE NEED TO 
PROPERLY DEFINE SECTION 10(B) 
TRAVIS S. SOUZA† 
ABSTRACT 
 In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc., the Supreme Court determined that primary liability under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does not extend to third-
party actors engaged in sham transactions, even when such 
transactions have the purpose and effect of deceiving investors. The 
Court reasoned that there is no liability when an actor’s deceptive 
conduct is not communicated directly to investors. This Note argues 
that the Supreme Court misinterpreted section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
and that policy considerations weigh in favor of using securities fraud 
litigation to deter culpable actors. It argues both for the substantial 
participation standard and the revitalization of scheme liability in 
order to best comply with the language and policies of section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and 
abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding 
and abetting suit under § 10(b).”1 In 1994, the Supreme Court 
declared that only primary violators—not aiders and abettors—could 
be held liable for federal securities fraud under the Securities 
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 1. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
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Exchange Act of 1934.2 Subsequently, lower courts struggled to reach 
a consensus regarding who qualifies as a primary violator. Adding to 
the confusion was another wrinkle: scheme liability emerged to 
increase the potential liability for third parties. In Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,3 the Supreme 
Court attempted to answer many of these questions when it held that 
liability is inappropriate even if an actor “engaged in conduct with the 
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of material fact to 
further a scheme to [deceive investors].”4 
This Note addresses the debate over primary liability under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of private securities class 
actions. Unsurprisingly, the arguments surrounding Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,5 and its subsequent effect, 
are well documented.6 Therefore, this Note does not weigh in on the 
issues specific to aiding and abetting liability. Instead, it focuses on 
the limits of primary liability in securities fraud with an emphasis on 
the developments surrounding scheme liability. 
Among traditional approaches to primary liability, the 
substantial participation approach is more appropriate than the 
bright-line approach because it better advances the policy objective of 
deterring culpable actors. The Supreme Court should have used 
scheme liability to achieve deterrence in Stoneridge, especially 
because many circuits refuse to move from the bright-line to the 
substantial participation approach. Important to both of these 
arguments is the recognition that both scheme liability and substantial 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, slip op. at 1 (U.S. 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
 4. Id., slip op. at 9. 
 5. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 6. E.g., Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b) 
and the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 667, 671–85 (2004) (analyzing the Central Bank decision and the tests that have 
emerged in the lower courts as a result); Edward Labaton, Commentary, The Gatekeepers Are 
Still Accountable Even After Central Bank and the Contract with America, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 
547–51 (1996) (discussing a federal district court case, In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 
960 (C.D. Cal. 1994), which relied heavily on the penultimate paragraph of the Court’s decision 
in Central Bank); Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s 
History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 885–93 (1995) (discussing Central Bank 
and predicting how lower courts will react to its holding); David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding 
and Abetting and Rule 10b-5 After Central Bank of Denver, 49 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1479 (1994) 
(discussing the historical background of Rule 10b-5 and urging an amendment of section 10 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “to provide aider and abettor liability”). 
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participation are completely consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Central Bank. Part I discusses the development of liability 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, culminating in an examination of 
the traditional approaches to primary liability. It argues that under 
the language of the statute, the substantial participation approach is 
appropriate. Part II introduces the issues surrounding scheme 
liability. It addresses the Stoneridge decision and argues that the 
Court’s reasoning in that case is flawed. Part III examines the possible 
policy objectives underlying section 10(b) liability, concluding that 
such liability should be imposed with a focus on deterring culpable 
actors. It then utilizes the deterrence objective and offers suggestions 
for courts to reach culpable conduct while critically examining the 
approaches to primary and scheme liability. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 LIABILITY 
A. Aiding and Abetting Pre-Central Bank 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits 
any person from directly or indirectly using or employing “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”7 More specifically, 
Rule 10b-5 prohibits: (a) employing “any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud”; (b) making “any untrue statement of a material fact 
or . . . omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary . . . to make the 
statements made . . . not misleading”; and (c) engaging “in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or 
deceit.”8 
A perpetual issue arising under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is 
the proper method for determining who can be held liable for a false 
or misleading statement.9 Prior to Central Bank, lower courts in 1966 
 
 7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
 9. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not expressly provide for a private right of action. Yet 
federal courts implied a private right of action early as 1946. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 
69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (“[T]he legislature may withhold from parties injured the 
right to recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute but the right is so 
fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not expressly denied the 
intention to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly.”). To find such a cause of action, 
courts looked beyond the statutory language to principles of tort law, finding that the purpose of 
the statute was to protect the interests of private parties, and “the mere omission of an express  
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began to read these rules as containing an implied private right of 
action against aiders and abettors.10 Courts used aiding and abetting 
liability for actors such as banks11 and accountants12 
B. A New Direction: The Central Bank Decision 
Central Bank of Denver served as the indenture trustee for 
bonds issued to finance improvements for a local public building 
authority.13 While it was trustee, Central Bank became aware that the 
appraisals of the land securing the bonds were potentially 
inaccurate.14 When the building authority defaulted, purchasers of the 
bonds sought to hold the bank liable for aiding and abetting under 
section 10(b).15 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not include a cause 
of action for aiding and abetting.16 
[T]he statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement 
(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act. The 
proscription does not include giving aid to a person who commits a 
manipulative or deceptive act. We cannot amend the statute to 
create liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or 
deceptive within the meaning of the statute.17 
Yet the Supreme Court provided no additional guidance 
regarding what it meant to make a “material misstatement.” As a 
result, it was left to the lower courts to determine when the conduct 
of an actor qualifies that actor as a primary violator under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Because a cause for aiding and abetting 
 
provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies.” Id. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the existence of a private right of action. 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“[A] private right of action under 
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. 
The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.”) (footnote omitted). 
 10. E.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 
1966), aff’d, 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 11. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624–30 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 12. Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1045–46 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 13. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 167 (1994). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 168. 
 16. Id. at 191. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Kennedy and was joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 166. Only Justices 
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas remained on the Court in 2008.  
 17. Id. 177–78 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
07__SOUZA.DOC 4/16/2008  8:40:07 AM 
2008] SECURITIES FRAUD 1183 
provided litigants with easier claims to establish, however, courts 
seldom examined the scope of primary liability prior to Central 
Bank.18 Since Central Bank, courts have been flooded with litigation 
questioning the boundaries of primary liability. The next Section 
outlines the methods that federal courts are using to grapple with 
primary liability. 
C. Approaches to Primary Liability 
Courts have developed multiple approaches to clarify the scope 
of primary liability with regards to false or misleading statements 
under Rule 10b-5. Three distinct approaches have surfaced: a bright-
line test, a substantial involvement test, and liability for a “scheme to 
defraud.” This Note examines each of these approaches in turn. This 
Section focuses on the first two, both of which developed soon after 
the Central Bank decision. The third approach, scheme liability, 
developed later and its possible impact warrants greater emphasis. As 
a result, it is discussed in great detail in Part II. 
1. Bright-Line Approach.  Under the first approach, to have 
actually made a false or misleading statement, that statement must be 
attributable to the actor, by the public, at the time of dissemination.19 
Several cases adopting the bright-line test illustrate this approach to 
determining when secondary actors are primarily liable. 
In Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,20 a stockholder in BT Office 
Products brought suit for allegedly materially false representations in 
connection with the corporation’s sale of common stock.21 The class 
action sought to hold the corporation’s independent auditor, Ernst & 
Young, liable for its oral approval of BT’s financial statements.22 The 
investor claimed that the accounting firm was reckless in its review of 
the financial statements and that the market relied on the fact that 
Ernst & Young approved the statements.23 
 
 18. See James D. Cox, Just Deserts for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 521 (1996) (“[T]he overbreadth of the courts’ construction of the earlier 
aiding and abetting standard prevented any clear development of the scope of primary 
participant liability.”). 
 19. Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 20. Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 21. Id. at 171. 
 22. Id. at 172. 
 23. Id. 
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After recognizing the varying approaches to primary liability,24 
the Second Circuit used a bright-line test to determine that anything 
short of a defendant actually making a false or misleading statement 
is insufficient to trigger primary liability.25 Furthermore, under this 
test, a statement is not made for section 10(b) purposes unless it is 
“attributed to that specific actor at the time of public dissemination, 
that is, in advance of the investment decision.”26 The court stated that 
because BT’s public statements did not mention Ernst & Young, the 
auditor was not responsible for making a material 
misrepresentation.27 
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s bright-line 
approach in Ziemba v. Cascade International, Inc.28 In Ziemba, the 
plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of purchasers of Cascade 
International’s common stock.29 The plaintiffs sought to hold 
Cascade’s legal counsel liable for its significant participation in 
drafting, creating, and reviewing Cascade’s allegedly fraudulent 
letters and press releases.30 Similarly, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Cascade’s accountants incorrectly advised Cascade that its financial 
statements did not need to be consolidated, failed to include “going 
concern” qualifications in its audit reports, and failed to disclose the 
fraud suggested by Cascade’s periodic reports.31 The court adopted 
the bright-line test, however, requiring that “the alleged misstatement 
or omission upon which a plaintiff relied must have been publicly 
attributable to the defendant at the time that the plaintiff’s 
investment decision was made.”32 The attorneys and accountants were 
not primarily liable under 10(b) because the allegations did not reach 
this level.33 
The primary argument in favor of the bright-line approach 
involves the issue of reliance.34 Proponents of the bright-line test find 
 
 24. Id. at 174–75 (recognizing the “bright-line” and “substantial participation” tests). 
 25. Id. at 175. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 29. Id. at 1197. 
 30. Id. at 1205. 
 31. Id. at 1207. 
 32. Id. at 1205. 
 33. Id. at 1213. 
 34. For a discussion of the counterarguments to this approach and the arguments in favor 
of the “substantial participation” approach, see infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. For a 
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it necessary to prevent Central Bank from becoming obsolete. “[I]f 
Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually 
make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under 
Section 10(b).”35 The concern over Central Bank’s continuing 
application is most evident with regard to the element of reliance. 
Courts have long said that reliance is an essential element of a 
securities action.36 Wright explicitly represented a commitment to 
reliance focused on by the Central Bank court.37 Requiring attribution 
of statements to an actor at the time of dissemination would ensure 
that those statements were in fact relied upon. Thus, the fear is that if 
liability lies when statements are not attributable to an actor, then it is 
unclear whether those injured truly relied on the conduct of that 
actor. 
2. Substantial Participation Approach.  The Ninth Circuit has 
championed a second method for determining primary liability: 
“substantial participation or intricate involvement in the preparation 
of fraudulent statements is grounds for primary liability even though 
that participation might not lead to the actor’s actual making of the 
statements.”38 
Deciding In re Software Toolworks Inc. Securities Litigation,39 the 
court held that underwriters and accountants who participated in the 
drafting and review of letters to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission could be held liable as primary violators of section 10(b) 
because of their “significant role in drafting and editing 
the . . . letter[s].”40 The primary argument in favor of the substantial 
 
discussion regarding the appropriate rationale supporting securities regulation and possible 
avenues using the development of scheme liability, see infra Part III. 
 35. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Shapiro v. 
Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 36. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462–63 (2d Cir. 1965) 
(“Disagreement centers on the applicability and meaning of the requirement that reliance be 
placed upon the misrepresentation. Our examination of the authorities satisfies us that this 
requirement also is carried over into civil suits under Rule 10b–5.”). 
 37. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 174 (“[A] § 10(b) cause of action based on aiding and abetting 
would circumvent the ‘reliance’ requirement of Rule 10b–5 . . . .” (citing Cent. Bank of Denver 
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994))). 
 38. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000); see also In re 
Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628–29 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
drafting or editing false statements that the drafter-editor knows will be publicly disseminated is 
sufficient for primary liability). 
 39. In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 40. Id. at 628 n.3. 
07__SOUZA.DOC 4/16/2008  8:40:07 AM 
1186 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1179 
participation approach, and the primary objection to the bright-line 
approach, is as follows: Holding actors with intricate involvement in 
wrongdoing liable deters culpable individuals and prevents injuries 
from going uncompensated.41 Punishing this wrongdoing prevents the 
bizarre result of culpable actors avoiding liability simply because their 
name was not attached to the public misstatement.42 
3. Blended Approach.  Possibly aware of the unsettling outcome 
of the bright-line test, the Tenth Circuit appears to combine aspects 
of both the bright-line and the substantial participation approach. In 
Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,43 the court considered liability 
of an independent auditor for his alleged participation in the 
preparation of registration statements, prospectuses, and opinion 
letters in regards to the corporation’s financial health.44 The investors 
claimed the auditor made statements with knowledge that they were 
false or at least with reckless disregard to their truthfulness.45 In a 
similar vein as Wright, the court determined that secondary actors 
“must themselves make a false or misleading statement (or omission) 
that they know or should know will reach potential investors.”46 
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit rejected a rule that would attach 
liability to actors who provided substantial assistance in the 
representations of others.47 Yet the court conceded that its approach 
was “far from a bright line.”48 The Tenth Circuit’s standard does not 
require that the statement actually be attributable to the actor. It 
instead focuses on whether the investor relied upon the statement.49 
 
 41. Robert A. Prentice, Locating That “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line 
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 727–28 
(1997) (“The principal weakness of the narrow approach lies in its potential to allow egregious 
wrongdoing to go unpunished and serious fraud-inflicted injuries to go uncompensated.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 42. See id. at 728 (“It is silly to conclude, in a case in which an accountant (or lawyer or 
investment banker) has this level of involvement, scienter, and motivation, that the 
communication is solely the client’s simply because it is issued under the client’s name.”). For a 
full discussion of this argument in the context of scheme liability, see infra Part II.C. 
 43. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 44. Id. at 1219. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1226. 
 47. Id. at 1226–27. 
 48. Id. at 1227. 
 49. Id. at 1225 (“The critical element separating primary from aiding and abetting 
violations is the existence of a representation . . . made by the defendant, that is relied upon by 
the plaintiff.”). 
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Moreover, the court differed from the bright-line approach by 
holding that an accountant who produces false opinions and 
certification letters may be primarily liable if corporate materials 
reproduce those statements.50 
D. The Plain Language: To “Make” an Untrue Statement 
Rule 10b-5(b) provides that it is unlawful for any person “[t]o 
make any untrue statement of a material fact.”51 It seems logical then, 
when considering whether an actor is a primary violator, that the 
boundaries would depend on whether an actor made the statement in 
issue. 
The implementation of the bright-line and substantial 
participation tests illustrate two potential meanings of the word 
“make.” The bright-line approach appears to equate “make” with 
attribution by shareholders, or more specifically, an actor’s name or 
signature on the statement.52 Conversely, the substantial participation 
approach equates “make” with the creation of the statement.53 The 
issue is which of these approaches stays truer to the language of Rule 
10b-5. 
The dictionary definition of the word “make” supports the 
substantial participation approach. According to Webster’s 
Unabridged Dictionary, “make” means “to bring into existence by 
shaping or changing material, combining parts, etc.,” or “to produce; 
cause to exist or happen; bring about.”54 Inquiring into whether an 
actor played a sufficiently significant role in drafting and editing a 
statement is quite similar to determining whether the actor produced 
or caused the statement to exist. Alternatively, the bright-line 
approach, which requires public attribution, cannot be supported by 
the common understanding of what it means to make a statement. 
 
 50. Id. at 1226. 
 51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 52. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at the time of public 
dissemination . . . .”). 
 53. See In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628–29 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(finding liability because of the actor’s role in drafting and editing statements). 
 54. WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1161 (Random House, 2d ed. 2005). 
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II.  SCHEME LIABILITY:  
A BATTLEGROUND FOR PRIMARY LIABILITY 
As the existence of two approaches indicates, the scope of 
primary liability is far from settled. A third possible avenue has been 
introduced, further muddying the waters. Litigants have drawn on 
language in Rule 10b-5 prohibiting “any . . . scheme . . . to defraud,”55 
claiming that defendants are primarily liable for their involvement in 
such a scheme regardless of whether they actually made a false or 
misleading statement.56 Once again, the lingering effect of Central 
Bank influences the debate. As a result, the issue regarding whether 
banks, accountants, attorneys, or other third parties may (or should) 
be held liable under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws is 
as alive as ever. This Part discusses the developments surrounding 
scheme liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. First, it looks at 
the origins of scheme liability and highlights the stakes for all 
involved. Second, this Part considers the cases in the only two circuits 
to have weighed in on the scheme liability debate. Finally, it examines 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC 
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.57 
A. Origins of Scheme Liability 
One of the earliest cases, and likely the most notable one, to 
employ scheme liability was In re Enron Corporation Securities, 
Derivative & ERISA Litigation.58 In Enron, the district court held that 
“secondary actors may be liable for primary violations under an 
alleged scheme to defraud if all the requirements for liability under 
Rule 10b-5 have been satisfied as to each secondary-actor defendant 
and any additional heightened pleading requirements have been 
met.”59 The plaintiffs tried to use scheme liability to capture actors 
who may not be liable under other post-Central Bank approaches to 
 
 55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2007). 
 56. See, e.g., Quaak v. Dexia, S.A., 357 F. Supp. 2d 330, 342 (D. Mass. 2005) (“[P]laintiffs 
allege that defendant’s actions were integral to the fraudulent scheme, and that defendant was a 
primary architect of the scheme to finance the sham entities. Therefore, plaintiffs have alleged 
facts sufficient to establish primary liability by defendant under Section 10(b).”). 
 57. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, slip op. at 1 (U.S. 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
 58. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 
2002). 
 59. Id. at 592. 
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primary liability. Enron was not alone. Several courts across the 
country soon faced similar arguments regarding scheme liability.60 It 
was only a matter of time before the cases moved up the ladder for 
the federal circuit courts to weigh in on the blossoming debate. The 
next Section discusses the first two circuit court cases to consider 
scheme liability. 
B. Circuit Court Approaches to Scheme Liability 
1. In re Charter Communications—The Narrow View.  In the 
case of In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litigation,61 
stockholders of Charter Communications brought a class action 
alleging that Charter, a national cable television provider, employed a 
scheme to artificially inflate its financial statements.62 Furthermore, 
the plaintiffs alleged that Charter’s vendors were liable for their role 
in the sham transactions, deliberately delayed customer 
disconnections, and improperly capitalized labor costs.63 The end 
result was to create artificial operating revenues and cash flows.64 
In the alleged scheme, the vendors sold set-top boxes to Charter, 
which then delivered the boxes to its cable customers.65 In addition to 
purchasing the boxes, Charter paid the vendors an additional twenty 
dollars per box.66 In return, the vendors spent the extra payments on 
advertising with Charter.67 The complaint alleged that these were 
 
 60. See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[W]here, 
as alleged here, a financial institution enters into deceptive transactions as part of a scheme in 
violation of Rule 10b–5(a) and (c) that causes foreseeable losses in the securities markets, that 
institution is subject to private liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5.”); Quaak, 357 F. 
Supp. 2d at 341 (“[P]rimary liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 may in some cases be 
found where a person ‘substantially participates in a manipulative or deceptive scheme . . . even 
if a material misstatement by another person creates the nexus between the scheme and the 
securities market.’” (quoting In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161, 173 (D. 
Mass. 2003))); In re Homestore.com Inc. Sec. Lit., 252 F. Supp. 2d. 1018, 1039–40 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (interpreting the Ninth Circuit to have held that “a person may be liable for participation 
in a ‘scheme’ even after Central Bank”). 
 61. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, slip op. at 1. The Supreme Court’s decision affirming Charter 
Communications is discussed in Part II.C. 
 62. In re Charter Commnc’ns, 443 F.3d at 989. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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sham transactions that lacked any economic substance, intended only 
to artificially inflate revenues and cash flows.68 The fraudulent 
financial statements resulted when Charter capitalized the additional 
equipment expenses while recognizing the advertising as current 
revenue.69 The plaintiffs alleged that the vendors knew of Charter’s 
intention to artificially inflate their financials.70 Yet they did not allege 
that that the vendors were involved in preparing or releasing the 
fraudulent statements.71 
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of how and whether 
scheme liability applied to Charter’s vendors as primary violators. 
The court returned to the analysis of Central Bank and read that case 
broadly to deny scheme liability: 
Thus, any defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be 
made a fraudulent misstatement or omission, or who does not 
directly engage in manipulative securities trading practices, is at 
most guilty of aiding and abetting and cannot be held liable under  
§ 10(b) or any subpart of Rule 10b-5.72 
Here, according to the court, the vendors simply entered into an 
arm’s-length transaction, and Charter was responsible for using the 
transaction to mislead shareholders.73 The vendors did not issue any 
fraudulent statement to the public, and they were under no duty to 
disclose the transaction or Charter’s financial status.74 As a result, the 
vendors were not liable under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 because 
scheme liability did not exist.75 
2. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner—The Expansive View.  The 
Ninth Circuit considered a similar legal question in Simpson v. AOL 
Time Warner Inc.,76 but reached a fundamentally different conclusion, 
recognizing that scheme liability may exist. In Simpson, investors 
brought a class action against Homestore.com, an Internet company, 
and outside defendants, including AOL Time Warner, Cendant 
 
 68. Id. at 989–90. 
 69. Id. at 990. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 992. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 992–93. 
 76. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Corporation, and L90, Inc.77 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendants were liable as primary participants under a theory of 
scheme liability.78 
In 1996, Homestore created an online real estate website.79 
Because many other internet startup companies at that time were 
recording net losses and negative cash flows, financial analysts placed 
emphasis on revenues as an indicator of future financial success of 
online companies.80 To meet revenue expectations, Homestore 
developed a series of complex transactions, and these “triangular” 
transactions were at issue in Simpson.81 
In the triangular transactions, Homestore would identify a third 
party in need of capital and agree to purchase that company’s shares 
at an inflated value.82 That company, instead of returning the excess 
payments to Homestore, would agree to purchase advertising from 
AOL for most or all of the total value Homestore initially paid.83 
AOL then pocketed a commission and shared the advertising revenue 
with Homestore.84 
The plaintiffs did not allege that AOL’s advertising agreements 
were sham transactions.85 They did, however, allege that one of 
AOL’s officers helped developed these transactions with Homestore 
and even sought out third parties for the deals.86 Additionally, 
plaintiffs claimed that a second AOL officer was liable for approving 
the transactions.87 
Plaintiffs also brought suit against Cendant and L90 for their role 
in alleged sham transactions.88 According to the allegations, 
Homestore bought Move.com, another real estate internet website, 
from Cendant at a grossly inflated amount.89 Cendant in turn recycled 
 
 77. Id. at 1042. 
 78. Id. at 1043. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1043–44. AOL became a party to these deals because Homestore in 1998 
purchased the right to be the only online real estate listing company on AOL. Id. at 1044. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1044–45. 
 89. Id. at 1044. 
07__SOUZA.DOC 4/16/2008  8:40:07 AM 
1192 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1179 
payments back to Homestore through a separate corporate entity set 
up by Cendant.90 Finally, plaintiffs alleged that L90 was a culpable 
third party for a similar role in a triangular transaction.91 In contrast 
with AOL and Cendant, there were no allegations that L90 was 
involved in developing the deals.92 
The Ninth Circuit faced the standard arguments that had been 
accompanying “scheme to defraud” cases. On the one hand, 
defendants argued that this was a dead issue: “Central Bank limited 
primary liability under § 10(b) to defendants who personally made a 
public misstatement, violated a duty to disclose or engaged in 
manipulative trading activity, and not to those engaged in a broader 
scheme to defraud.”93 Alternatively, plaintiffs sought a reading of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that held actors involved in a scheme to 
defraud liable as primary violators for involvement, whether direct or 
indirect, in a scheme to defraud.94 The Ninth Circuit adopted the 
broader reading of Rule 10b-5: 
[T]o be liable as a primary violator of § 10(b) for participation in a 
“scheme to defraud,” the defendant must have engaged in conduct 
that had the principal purpose and effect of creating a false 
appearance of fact in furtherance of the scheme. It is not enough 
that a transaction in which a defendant was involved had a deceptive 
purpose and effect; the defendant’s own conduct contributing to the 
transaction or overall scheme must have had a deceptive purpose 
and effect.95 
Following this rule, the court determined that even using a 
scheme liability approach, the allegations were not sufficient to state 
a claim against the defendants as primary violators.96 The claims were 
 
 90. Id. at 1044–45. Over the course of two years, Cendant returned eighty million dollars to 
Homestore in exchange for products and services. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1043. 
 94. Id. The court also noted: 
The SEC argues in its amicus brief that “Any person who directly or indirectly 
engages in a manipulative or deceptive act as part of a scheme to defraud can be a 
primary violator.” The SEC defines ‘a deceptive act’ as “engaging in a transaction 
whose principle purpose and effect is to create a false appearance of revenues.” 
Id. at 1048. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 1054 (“Because the [plaintiffs] do[] not allege a valid claim for primary 
liability under any theory of liability, the district court properly dismissed the claims . . . against 
the Defendants.”). 
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inadequate because they failed to allege that AOL and its officers 
were engaged in deceptive activity. The claims did allege that AOL 
assisted in the creation of the sham transactions and acted as a 
conduit for the return of revenue; yet they did not allege that AOL 
“created sham entities or engaged in deceptive conduct as part of 
illegitimate transactions.”97 Furthermore, there was no allegation that 
AOL entered into a transaction that lacked economic value.98 
Because actual advertisements were purchased and sold, the leg of 
the transaction involving AOL was not deceptive.99 Ultimately, 
because AOL’s conduct was suspect only when viewed in conjunction 
with Homestore’s actions, AOL was not liable as a primary violator.100 
Similarly, the Cendant and L90 transactions did not give rise to 
liability because they did not create a false appearance.101 The 
plaintiffs failed to allege that Cendant concealed reality by agreeing 
to engage in future deals.102 In fact, according to the court, there was 
no false appearance independent of the fraudulent accounting by 
Homestore.103 As a result, Cendant was not a primary actor in a 
scheme to defraud.104 Likewise, L90 was not primarily liable for its 
actions because it did not help create the scheme, and it did not act 
with the primary purpose of creating a false appearance and therefore 
without a principal legitimate business purpose.105 
Consequently, according to the Ninth Circuit, scheme liability 
should be available to hold actors liable for those actions that do not 
have a “principal legitimate business purpose.”106 
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In: Stoneridge Investment Partners 
In 2008, the Supreme Court reviewed the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Charter Communications.107 In Stoneridge, the Court 
 
 97. Id. at 1052–53. 
 98. Id. at 1053. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. (“While AOL would be liable under § 10(b) for its deceptive conduct as part of 
a scheme to defraud if AOL engaged in deceptive conduct, it may not be held liable for 
participating in legitimate transactions that became ‘deceptive’ only when distorted by the 
willful or intentional fraud of another party.”). 
 101. Id. at 1053–54. 
 102. Id. at 1053. 
 103. Id. at 1054. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1050. 
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affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s narrow view and held that investors do 
not have a cause of action against third-party actors who take part in 
sham transactions with the purpose and effect of furthering a scheme 
to defraud.108 
The Court reasoned that reliance by investors is necessary to 
establish the liability of a particular vendor.109 Because the vendors 
were under no duty to disclose the truth regarding the transactions 
and the deceptive acts were not communicated to the public, 
investors did not specifically rely on the vendors’ role in the sham 
transaction and liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not 
exist.110 
Explicitly addressing the issue of scheme liability, the Court 
rejected the argument that deceptive acts in furtherance of fraudulent 
transactions are sufficient to create liability.111 Although those 
transactions are reflected in financial statements disseminated to the 
public and relied upon by investors, such a causal link is “too 
remote.”112 Therefore, unless an actor makes it “necessary or 
inevitable” that a transaction will become a fraudulent public 
statement, scheme liability is unavailable as a tool for primary liability 
in securities fraud cases.113 
The following Section responds to key misconceptions 
surrounding primary and scheme liability. Part III offers an approach 
to primary liability that is consistent with the landmark decision of 
Central Bank, follows the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
and provides a socially optimal outcome. 
D. Scheme Liability: A Misinterpretation of Section 10(b) and 
Central Bank 
Two arguments have been levied against scheme liability. First, 
because an actor is not responsible for making statements available to 
 
 107. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, slip op. at 1 (U.S. 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id., slip op. at 8. 
 110. Id., slip op. at 8–9. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id., slip op. at 10. 
 113. See id. (“[N]othing respondents did made it necessary or inevitable for Charter to 
record the transactions as it did.”). 
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the public, investors cannot claim to have relied on such actions.114 
Second, the Central Bank decision precludes liability for secondary 
actors engaging in sham transactions with the purpose and effect of 
misleading investors. The flaws of these arguments are addressed in 
turn. 
1. Reliance.  In Stoneridge, the Court denied liability on the 
grounds that investors failed to rely on the deceptive acts of third-
party vendors engaged in sham transactions with a publicly traded 
company.115 The argument is as follows: in the absence of a duty to 
disclose or the making of a public statement, an investor must show 
direct reliance. Because it was the publicly traded company that 
issued the statements as opposed to the vendors, investors could not 
show the requisite reliance.116 The Court reasoned that allowing such 
a broad reading of the reliance requirement would create a “cause of 
action [that] would reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing 
company does business.”117 Consequently, as long as the third party’s 
actions do not make the fraudulent statement “necessary or 
inevitable,” investors did not rely on those actions.118 
The Court’s application of the reliance requirement is flawed. It 
is widely accepted that reliance is an element of actions brought 
under section 10(b) to ensure that there is a sufficient causal 
connection between an actor’s conduct and an investor’s injury.119 The 
Court has never held that an investor must be aware of the specific 
acts that create the misstatement in order to meet the reliance 
requirement. In fact, it has expressly held that reliance can be 
satisfied indirectly.120 Specifically, the Court has determined that 
reliance on the integrity of an efficient market into which a 
misrepresentation is disseminated is sufficient.121 
The Court in Stoneridge recognized this “fraud-on-the-market” 
theory, but concluded that it only extends liability to the party that 
 
 114. See id., slip op. at 8 (“Respondents had no duty to disclose; and their deceptive acts 
were not communicated to the public. . . . Petitioner, as a result, cannot show reliance upon any 
of respondents’ actions except in an indirect chain that we find too remote for liability.”). 
 115. Id., slip op. at 1. 
 116. Id., slip op. at 10–11. 
 117. Id., slip op. at 9. 
 118. Id., slip op. at 9–10. 
 119. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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disseminates the public statement. This conclusion is faulty for two 
reasons. First, as discussed in Part I.D, it misconstrues the language of 
Rule 10b-5. Parties should be viewed as making public statements if 
they are intimately involved in the acts that create those statements. 
Consequently, if third-party actors engage in sham transactions that 
are the basis of the public misstatements, and they do so with the 
purpose and effect of defrauding investors, the reliance requirement 
should be met. 
Second, the “fraud-on-the-market” theory is not intended to 
limit reliance as the Court purports. To the contrary, the underlying 
purpose for the theory is to establish reliance when a party causes a 
misstatement that injures investors.122 Consequently, a finding of 
reliance in cases of scheme liability requires an inquiry into whether 
an actor’s deceptive acts sufficiently caused such statements to be 
made. Without such an inquiry, the Court in Stoneridge should not 
have concluded that the reliance requirement was absent. 
2. Keeping Central Bank alive. Another theme runs beneath the 
list of arguments set forth by opponents of scheme liability. It is 
argued that scheme liability serves as an effort to overrule, or at least 
skirt, the holding in Central Bank.123 The argument is premised on the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of aiding and abetting liability. The Court 
reasoned that in light of the statute’s silence regarding aiding and 
abetting liability, such liability did not exist.124 Opponents argue that 
allowing liability for a scheme to defraud would subvert this decision: 
The arguments made [in favor of scheme liability] should thus be 
seen for what they are: an ill-conceived third bite at the apple and an 
attempt to achieve through the back door—by redefining “primary” 
liability to include aiding and abetting claims—that which the[y] 
could not accomplish through the front door. Indeed . . . 
[proponents] articulat[e] a position here that is diametrically 
opposed to the Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank.125 
This argument assumes that scheme liability is essentially 
equivalent to historical claims for aiding and abetting liability because 
 
 122. Id.  
 123. See, e.g., Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee Time Warner Inc. at 36, Simpson v. 
AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-55665) (“[T]his effort [to use 
scheme liability] flies in the face of Central Bank and should be firmly rejected.”). 
 124. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 187–88 (1994). 
 125. Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee Time Warner Inc., supra note 123, at 38. 
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both claims attempt to hold actors liable when the actor did not make 
or substantially participate in creating a false or misleading 
statement.126 Accordingly, opponents argue that there is no practical 
difference between assisting in the primary violation, the aiding and 
abetting definition of liability, and engaging in a deceptive act as part 
of a scheme.127 “Put another way, the SEC has simply redefined 
‘primary’ liability to include ‘aiding and abetting.’”128 
This argument, however, misunderstands the statutory language 
of section 10(b) and the central reasoning of Central Bank. The 
language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not provide conclusive 
insight into the proper scope of primary liability. According to the 
Supreme Court, the text of the statute, not the underlying rule, 
initially governs the boundaries of liability in securities fraud 
litigation.129 Yet nothing in the language of section 10(b) suggests that 
liability is limited to actors who actually make a false statement or 
even to those who substantially participate in the preparation of the 
false statement. On the contrary, section 10(b) is worded broadly to 
prohibit any person from using or employing any deceptive device, 
directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.130 The Supreme Court provided only two reasons for not 
reading such language to include aiding and abetting. First, aiding and 
abetting goes beyond even those that are indirectly involved and 
reaches actors not engaged in the prohibited activity.131 Second, 
several other provisions in the same Act use the “directly or 
indirectly” language without imposing aiding and abetting liability.132 
 
 126. Cases in the years following Central Bank have also reacted unfavorably toward finding 
third party actors liable as primary violators, citing Central Bank as a limitation on the reach of 
section 10(b). See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 n.10 (10th Cir. 
1996) (“Some post-Central Bank of Denver cases have held that third party defendants can be 
liable for statements made by others, where the defendant substantially participated in 
preparing the statements. To the extent these cases allow liability to attach without requiring a 
representation to be made by defendant, and reformulate the ‘substantial assistance’ element of 
aiding and abetting liability into primary liability, they do not comport with Central Bank of 
Denver.”) (citations omitted). 
 127. Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee Time Warner Inc., supra note 123, at 42. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (“With respect, however, to the first issue, the scope of 
conduct prohibited by § 10(b), the text of the statute controls our decision.”). 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 131. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176. 
 132. Id. 
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These arguments, however, are inapplicable to the issue of primary 
liability. 
Instead, the Supreme Court in Central Bank offered no guidance 
as to the outer limits of primary liability. Quite to the contrary, the 
Court explicitly recognizes that its holding bears only on secondary 
liability: 
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean 
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from 
liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a 
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or 
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser 
or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 
10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under 
Rule 10b-5 are met.133 
This language recognizes that the question of aiding and abetting 
liability, addressed in Central Bank, is distinct from the issue of 
primary liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court left the scope of 
primary liability completely unaddressed. 
At the heart of the Central Bank opinion is the point that the 
plain language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not prohibit 
aiding and abetting. The Supreme Court determined that private suits 
under section 10(b) “have emphasized adherence to the statutory 
language . . . .”134 Furthermore, essential to the Court’s holding was 
the fact that any mention of aiding and abetting liability was absent 
from the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.135 As a result, the 
Supreme Court addressed the statutory language regarding aiding 
and abetting liability, but offered no analysis of the language as it 
pertains to primary liability.136 
Central Bank, as a result, does not preclude the issues that 
subsequently presented themselves in cases involving liability for a 
scheme to defraud. Opponents to the use of scheme liability miss this 
point. A scheme to defraud involves primary liability, not aiding and 
abetting liability. That there may be factual similarities in the pre–
 
 133. Id. at 191 (emphasis removed). 
 134. Id. at 173. 
 135. See id. at 177 (“If, as respondents seem to say, Congress intended to impose aiding and 
abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory text. 
But it did not.”). 
 136. See id. at 191 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we 
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”). 
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Central Bank aiding and abetting cases and later scheme to defraud 
cases does not mean that the Supreme Court has answered both sets 
of questions. On the contrary, following Central Bank, the first step in 
analyzing liability for a scheme to defraud is the language of Rule 
10(b). The statute is not silent regarding primary liability, unlike 
aiding and abetting liability. The statute necessarily refers to primary 
violators, because otherwise the statute would be useless. Yet the 
language does not address the scope of primary liability. Therefore, at 
a minimum, it appears that the language of the statute is ambiguous 
as to the definition of primary liability. 
Additionally, considering the language of Rule 10b-5 in 
conjunction with section 10(b) reveals that primary liability for a 
scheme to defraud does exist. Unlike liability for aiding and abetting, 
liability for a scheme to defraud is expressly stated under Rule  
10b-5.137 Section 10(b) explicitly delegated authority to prescribe this 
rule.138 Accordingly, the rule makes it “unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly . . . [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud . . . .”139 As a result, scheme liability has a hook in both the 
language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, making it distinct from past 
aiding and abetting theories. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has stated that section 10(b) is to be 
interpreted flexibly, as opposed to technically and restrictively, to 
fulfill the purposes of the statute.140 Thus, the Court’s conclusion in 
Stoneridge was not mandated by the language of the statute or the 
Court’s prior precedent. To understand who should be held liable as a 
primary violator, it is necessary to examine the appropriate policy 
objective of regulating securities fraud. 
III.  THE APPROPRIATE POLICY OBJECTIVE: 
 DETERRING CULPABLE ACTORS 
The boundaries of primary liability and scheme liability are 
unsettled and continuously developing. There is a lack of clarity in the 
statutory language with regard to what constitutes a primary violator, 
and courts were unable to agree on any useful guidelines for scheme 
 
 137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2007). 
 138. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (making section 10(b) subject to “such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors”). 
 139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 140. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002). 
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liability. In uncertain situations like this one, the policy objectives 
behind the statute become especially important. In this case, it is 
necessary to interpret the statute broadly to fulfill its purposes. 
This Part evaluates the approaches of primary and scheme 
liability in light of policy objectives. First, it determines that the 
appropriate policy objective behind securities litigation is the 
deterrence of culpable actors. Second, it uses this objective to 
evaluate the approaches. In doing so, this Part concludes that both 
the substantial participation approach and scheme liability are more 
in line with the deterrence objective than is the bright-line approach. 
Yet in the absence of reconsideration by the Court, Stoneridge has 
effectively stripped private litigants of the necessary tools to reach 
culpable actors. 
A. The Policy Debate: Compensation versus Deterrence 
Two policy objectives are commonly offered as the underlying 
rationale for securities litigation: compensation and deterrence.141 This 
Section briefly explains the arguments for each approach and 
determines that deterrence is the appropriate rationale for securities 
regulation in general. 
1. Compensation.  The compensatory rationale is that those 
who have been unjustly injured should be entitled to repayment for 
the loss.142 In the context of securities litigation, critics have attacked 
this goal from many different angles, revealing substantial flaws. First, 
a number of commentators have criticized securities litigation for the 
amount of nonmeritorious litigation that results in a loss to 
shareholders.143 Additionally, others have criticized the compensation 
 
 141. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and 
Its Implementation 7, 14–25 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working 
Paper No. 293, 2006), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/ 
wp_listing_1/wp_listing/291-300#942287; see also James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the 
Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (1997) (“Compensating 
the injured and deterring future violations are frequently seen as complementary objectives of 
private suits.”). 
 142. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
497, 497 (1997) (“Securities class actions proceed with the objective of permitting those 
separated wrongfully from their wealth to get some of it back.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1465, 1469–74 (2004) (arguing that securities class actions are often frivolous). 
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rationale on the basis that securities litigation overcompensates.144 As 
a result, some academics have argued for caps on securities 
damages.145 Finally, from the opposite point of view, some have 
argued that securities class actions are failing to adequately 
compensate investors.146 For example, empirical evidence reveals that 
settlement amounts in securities class actions represent less than 3 
percent of the overall investor losses in stock price decline.147 
This Note does not address the validity of such arguments, but 
provides them only to illustrate that there is little support for the 
efficacy of compensation as a rationale for securities litigation. 
Instead, it seeks to illustrate a more fundamental flaw in the 
compensatory rationale, which, in combination with the arguments in 
this Section, shows that compensation is not the appropriate objective 
of securities litigation. 
The principal problem with compensation is that a vast majority 
of the money paid out as compensation to injured investors, whether 
from judgments or settlements, is funded by the investors 
themselves.148 As a result, instead of compensating investors for their 
losses, securities litigation simply takes money out of the pocket of 
one investor and places it in the pocket of another. 
If the details of this phenomenon are not initially obvious, 
consider the following “pocket-shifting”149 explanation: A 
 
 144. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 646 (1996) (“[T]here will be systematic overcompensation over time to many 
investors.”). 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 657–62 (examining the possibility of capping recovery in securities 
litigation). 
 146. E.g., Coffee, supra note 141, at 14 (“From a compensatory perspective, the conclusion 
seems inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly.”). 
 147. Id. at 14–15. These numbers, however, are computed according to the total loss in stock 
price as opposed to the loss attributed to the alleged fraud. Id. Additionally, the statistics focus 
solely on settlements of securities class actions. See id. at 14 (“Settlements recover only a very 
small share of investor losses.”) (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. at 26 (“As a result, at least in the aggregate, diversified investors are making wealth 
transfers to themselves . . . .”). 
 149. The notion of the pocket shifting is far from a novel idea. In fact, it has been recognized 
quite often by academics in the securities field. E.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, 
Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 
691, 698–700; Coffee, supra note 141, at 26 (“[D]iversified investors are making wealth transfers 
to themselves, shifting money, as it were, from one pocket to the other—minus, of course, the 
considerable transaction costs that both sides pay to the legal profession.”); Langevoort, supra 
note 144, at 649 (“Thus, we can say with some confidence that investors fund a very sizable 
portion (perhaps nearly all) of their own compensatory system.”); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution 
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 635 (1992); Roberta 
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fundamental feature of corporate existence is the separation of 
control and ownership.150 Additionally, ownership is typically held in 
the hands of numerous investors, each owning a relatively small 
portion.151 In the typical securities class action, all investors who 
purchased stock while a fraudulent misstatement affected the market 
bring suit for their losses.152 In the event that they do recover, either 
by judgment or settlement, the corporation will pay the 
compensation.153 Yet a group of current investors owns the 
corporation. It is these investors, therefore, that bear the burden of 
the judgment or settlement. Consequently, money shifts from one 
group of investors, who currently owns the corporate stock, to a 
second group, who purchased stock in the affected period.154 
This transfer, from one group of investors to another, does not 
itself reveal the flaw of shifting money from one pocket to another. If 
this was the end of the story, only one group of investors would 
receive compensation. Yet imagine the problem if an investor was 
part of both groups. In such a case, the pocket-shifting phenomenon 
becomes evident, and there is no compensation for loss. The investor 
is both paying out the judgment and receiving it. This is not a 
hypothetical problem. The vast majority of shareholders are 
institutional investors.155 These investors are quite diversified, owning 
stock in a multitude of corporations and investing at several different 
times.156 As a result, pocket shifting not only could occur, but most 
often does occur. It happens in either of the following situations: First, 
investors buy shares in a company during both time periods involved 
in a suit, meaning they fall in the group bringing suit and in the group 
 
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 62–63 
(1991). 
 150. E.g., Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and 
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1998) 
(discussing “the separation of the roles of owner and management”). 
 151. Coffee, supra note 141, at 25–26 (“Because of the long-established separation of 
ownership and control in the United States, the vast majority of the stock in ‘public’ companies 
will be owned by dispersed shareholders holding relatively small percentage stakes.”). 
 152. Id. at 26. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Langevoort, supra note 144, at 647 (recognizing “the growing institutionalization of 
the markets”). 
 156. Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1997) (“One fundamental means by which institutions manage risk is 
through diversification—building a portfolio consisting of relatively small ownership stakes in 
many different companies.”). 
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that will bear the financial burden of the judgment or settlement.157 
Second, even if not on both sides of the litigation, the investors may 
still own stock in several corporations involved in securities litigation. 
In some of these suits, they are in the group bringing the securities 
claim. In other cases, they are in the current ownership group. 
Therefore, on the whole, these investors will be on both sides of the 
lawsuit. Consequently from a compensation perspective, securities 
litigation often results in nothing more than investors bearing the 
burden for their own losses—a result wholly inconsistent with the 
underlying goal of compensation. 
The problem of pocket shifting, combined with the numerous 
other arguments against compensation, shows that compensation is 
an inappropriate rationale in the securities litigation context. Because 
the means for achieving the compensation rationale are 
fundamentally flawed, any reform that ignores other rationales is 
likely to be futile. Even if some justification for compensation still 
exists, there is a more appropriate rationale: deterrence. 
2. Deterrence.  The second rationale for securities regulation is 
deterrence of culpable actors. The baseline argument for this 
rationale is that by imposing financial burdens upon actors for 
specified conduct, those and other actors will be less likely to 
continue or repeat that conduct in the future.158 This line of reasoning 
is grounded in an economic approach. Ultimately, assuming that 
actors are rational, their misconduct will be deterred at the point that 
the potential gain from the given action is outweighed by the 
expected loss.159 This loss is a product of the size of the fine and the 
probability of detection.160 
Deterrence, however, is not without its drawbacks. To be 
effective, deterrence must focus on the culpable actors. One of the 
problems with a deterrence rationale relates to the discussion of 
compensation: The financial burden is borne by the shareholders of 
the corporation, none of whom are generally culpable for the 
 
 157. Coffee, supra note 141, at 26–27. 
 158. See Langevoort, supra note 144, at 651–52 (“Usually, the out-of-pocket regime is 
defended instead because of its deterrence capacity: it is what is necessary to get selfish 
managers to behave.”). 
 159. Cox, supra note 142, at 2. 
 160. Id. 
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wrongdoing.161 Moreover, even when culpable actors face personal 
lawsuits for their wrongdoing, they often have insurance against the 
financial penalties, further minimizing any deterrent effect.162 
It is evident that the existing securities laws must be reformed to 
effectively deter wrongful conduct. Yet the numerous possible 
reforms163 are not the issue here; this Note only focuses on the issue of 
scheme liability. As a means of supplementing other reforms, courts 
should refocus their analysis on deterring the culpable actors when 
considering the boundaries of primary liability and, more specifically, 
liability for a scheme to defraud. 
B. Deterring Culpable Conduct: Focus on Culpability of the Conduct, 
Not Identity of the Actor 
Even in the wake of Stoneridge, scheme liability—and, more 
broadly, primary liability under section 10b-5—remains unsettled. 
This Note argues that in determining the boundaries of scheme 
liability, courts should focus on deterring culpable actors. Such a 
suggestion seems obvious, but is not always followed in practice. This 
Section highlights situations in which the approaches to primary 
liability and scheme liability stray from this basic premise. 
In analyzing primary liability in the wake of Central Bank, many 
courts have focused on the identity of the actors, as opposed to the 
culpability of their actions.164 This analysis often produces unfortunate 
 
 161. Langevoort, supra note 144, at 648 (“[N]early all the money paid out as compensation 
in the form of judgments and settlements comes, one way or another, from investors themselves. 
Little if any of the sum is contributed by those who were the primary authors of the 
fraud . . . .”). 
 162. See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., RECENT 
TRENDS III: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? 9 (1995) 
(stating that in the average settlement, 68.2 percent comes from the insurer, 31.4 percent from 
the issuer, and only 0.4 percent from the individual defendants). 
 163. See Coffee, supra note 141, at 39–50 (discussing various possible remedies). 
 164. See Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (examining “the 
threshold requirement to show that a secondary actor, such as a lawyer or an accountant, is 
primarily liable under § 10(b)” (emphasis added)); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 
1215, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting “a rule allowing liability to attach to an accountant or 
other outside professional who provided ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ assistance to the 
representations of others” and holding that to be liable, secondary actors “must themselves 
make a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know or should know will reach 
potential investors” (emphasis added)); In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 
628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that accountants may be primarily liable for statements made by 
others when the accountants reviewed the statements and played a significant role in the 
drafting and editing of the statements). 
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results. This is most evident in the bright-line approach to primary 
liability.165 In the leading case adopting that approach, the Second 
Circuit determined that primary liability turned on whether the 
statement could be “attributed to that specific actor at the time of 
public dissemination, that is, in advance of the investment decision.”166 
Furthermore, if an actor’s name is absent from the statement, that 
statement cannot be “attributed to that specific actor.”167 
Consequently, the bright-line approach focuses solely upon the 
statement and those names attached to that public statement. Under 
this rule, actors who mastermind a plan, put all the pieces in place, 
and even create the written statement are not primary violators under 
section 10(b) as long as their names are absent from the statement. 
One might think that such a ludicrous result cannot possibly be the 
law, yet it appears to be under the bright-line approach. 
The result of a focus on attribution of the statement is a 
disconnect between the purpose of securities regulation and the 
rhetoric of the courts analyzing primary liability. As discussed in 
Section A.2, the driving rationale of securities regulation should be 
deterrence, and in the context of section 10(b), the deterrence 
purpose should be cabined with a measure of predictability. Yet the 
case law surrounding the bright-line approach lacks any discussion of 
such goals. 
The substantial participation approach to primary liability is 
much more likely to address the deterrence objective.168 As 
enunciated by the Ninth Circuit, actors may be liable as primary 
violators if they have a significant enough role in the creation of the 
statement.169 Under this approach, specific conduct is examined to 
determine whether or not the actors undertook significant efforts in 
the statement’s drafting and editing.170 As a result of its focus on 
conduct, the substantial participation approach actually deters 
culpable actors by holding them liable as primary violators. 
Because most circuits do not subscribe to the substantial 
participation approach, however, section 10(b) remains detached 
from its underlying objectives. Scheme liability appeared to provide 
 
 165. For a full discussion of the bright-line approach, see supra Part I.C.1. 
 166. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 167. Id. 
 168. For a full discussion of the substantial participation approach, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 169. In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d at 628 n.3. 
 170. Id. 
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the opportunity for needed reform. Under scheme liability, liability 
would turn on the conduct rather than the identity of the actor. 
Because liability turns on conduct, scheme liability could have been 
more successful than the bright-line approach in deterring culpable 
conduct. Yet the Court’s decision in Stoneridge appears to deliver a 
blow to the objectives of securities litigation. The Court denied 
liability for deceptive acts of third-party vendors engaged in sham 
transactions with a publicly traded company.171 Although it left open 
the possibility of scheme liability in cases in which reliance can be 
established, this is unlikely when a third-party actor does not 
disseminate the statements directly to the public. As a result, scheme 
liability may not be the ultimate tool for deterring culpable actors. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in Central Bank resolved the issue of whether 
aiding and abetting liability exists under section 10(b).172 Not until 
Stoneridge, however, did the Supreme Court resolve the limits of 
primary liability and scheme liability. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court appears to have missed the 
mark. It neglected to recognize that the language of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 is vastly different as it pertains to primary liability—
especially scheme liability—than it is in relation to aiding and 
abetting liability. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 appear to allow 
primary liability for a variety of actors. At the very least, the language 
is ambiguous to this effect. 
As a result of this ambiguity, the objectives of securities 
regulation and section 10(b) are paramount. Accordingly, the Court 
appears to have lost sight of the importance of deterring the culpable 
actors behind fraudulent statements and deceitful schemes. Its flawed 
application of the reliance requirement in securities litigation will 
likely stunt the development of scheme liability as a means of holding 
culpable actors responsible for their actors. This Note does not intend 
to provide the only approaches or tests for outlining primary and 
scheme liability. Instead, it offers suggestions within the framework of 
the deterrence essential to section 10(b) liability. Many more reforms 
may be possible to accomplish such objectives. If courts continue to 
 
 171. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, slip op. at 1 (U.S. 
Jan. 15, 2008).  
 172. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
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lose sight of the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as 
their underlying purposes, the resulting doctrines for primary and 
scheme liability will be little more than empty rhetoric. 
